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Case No. 20090274-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Abraham Mario Shaffer, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony. This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over provision of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (WestSupp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend that 
Defendant's prison term be suspended and that he be given probation, conditioned 
on his serving two years in jail with credit for time served. But under statutory law, a 
sentencing court may require, as a condition of probation, only that a defendant 
serve "a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail/' At sentencing, first 
defense counsel and then the prosecutor told the court that the State agreed to 
recommend that Defendant be given probation, conditioned on his serving one year 
in jail, with no credit for time served. Had the trial court followed the modified 
recommendation, Defendant's total time served would have been approximately the 
same, but slightly longer, than the time contemplated by the original 
recommendation. 
1. Did the trial court plainly err by not sua sponte finding that Defendant's 
and the State's modified recommendation amounted to a breach of the plea 
agreement? 
Standard of Review. To establish plain error, a defendant must show that 
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 12,153 P.3d 804, 
cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). Review for plain error does not lie, however, 
where Defendant, through counsel, "affirmatively represented to the [trial] court 
that he ... had no objection to the [proceedings]." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 16, 
164 P.3d 366 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
2. Was defense counsel ineffective for agreeing to the modified 
recommendation? 
Standard of Review. "When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised 
for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a 
question of law.'" Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, % 11 (quoting State v. Holbert, 2002 
UT App 426, | 26, 61 P.3d 291 (additional citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
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3. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that the prosecution breached the plea agreement by not making any 
recommendation for the presentence report, where nothing in the record supports 
those claims? 
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2. 
4. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by requesting "gang 
conditions" as part of probation, where the prosecutor made no promise not to 
recommend probation conditions? 
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2. 
5. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by expressing 
"concerns with the defendant's family" in connection with her request for probation 
and a jail term, where the prosecutor made no promise not to address the need for 
probation? 
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2. 
6. Can Defendant prevail on his plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by advising the 
court of the victim's views on Defendant's sentence, where the prosecutor has the 
responsibility to assist the victim in exercising his right to be heard and a duty to 
3 
bring relevant information to the court's attention, and where the prosecutor made 
no promise not to convey this relevant information? 
Standard of Review. See standards of review set forth under issues 1 and 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Based on a January 30, 2008 incident, the State charged Defendant with one 
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (West 2004). Rl-5. The State also charged Defendant with use of a 
dangerous weapon in the commission of the robbery, subjecting him to enhanced 
penalties under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004), and with commission of 
the crime in concert with two or more persons, subjecting him to additional 
enhanced penalties under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2005). Id. 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. See R103, 95-102, 
R131:l-10. Under the terms of the plea, Defendant pled guilty to aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony. R95. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss 
gun and gang enhancements; recommend a suspended prison sentence and 
probation conditioned on "2 years in jail with credit for time served"; and, upon 
Defendant's successful completion of probation, to join in a section 76-3-402 motion 
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to reduce the degree of Defendant's conviction from a first degree to a second 
degree felony. R99 (quotation completed in top margin). 
At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel stated that the prosecution had 
offered to dismiss the "gun and gang enhancements], which would have added a 
total of five years to the potential sentencing in this case." R131:3-4. He said that 
"the State will be recommending ... both to ... the pre-sentence investigator and at 
the time of sentencing ... that the prison sentence in this case be suspended and that 
the Court instead order [Defendant] to serve two years in the County Jail, with 
credit for time served/' R131:4. Finally, he said that "in the event that [Defendant] is 
successful in completing this five-year probationary period,1 upon being released 
from the County Jail, assuming that the Court does choose to approve ... that 
sentencing recommendation, at the conclusion of the five years, probation having 
been successfully completed, the State will be joining in [the defense] motion for the 
degree of the offense to be lowered by one level/7 R131:3-4. The prosecutor agreed 
that this was the State's offer. R131:4. 
The district court cautioned Defendant that there was "no guarantee that [the 
court] won't impose [a sentence of five years to life in prison], even though the State 
1
 The plea bargain contemplated a five-years-total probationary period, 
including two years in jail (with credit for time served) and 36 additional months of 
supervised probation. 
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is not recommending that [and], in fact, is recommending a jail sentence instead/' 
R131:5. Defendant said that he understood. R131:6. 
The court set sentencing and ordered Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) to 
prepare a presentence investigation report. AP&P filed its report, concluding that 
Defendant "presented] a serious threat of violent behavior" and his attitude was 
"not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting/7 and recommending that 
the trial court sentence Defendant to a prison term of five years to life with credit for 
375 days served. See PSI filed by AP&P (AP&P PSI) at Attachment, Form 4.2 The 
parties stipulated to a continuance, and the trial court continued sentencing. 
R105-06. Before sentencing, Judicial Supervision Services filed a second pre-
sentence investigation report. See PSI filed by Judicial Supervision Services (JSS 
PSI).3 
2
 Both sentencing reports are included in an envelope assigned record number 
R134. 
3
 The JSS PSI observed that Defendant had "deliberately attempted to present 
a distorted image of his role in this crime and minimize his actions." Id. at 3. The 
PSI recommended that Defendant be sentenced to a prison term of five years to life, 
to be suspended upon various conditions including a condition that he complete a 
substance abuse program at the Adult Detention Center for up to one year—in 
addition to time served. Id. at 4. 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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At sentencing, defense counsel explained that "the State [had] agreed to 
recommend a year in jail beyond the time that [Defendant] had already served and 
at the conclusion of that year ... recommend [that] he be placed on probation/' 
R132:4. Counsel then addressed the conclusion in both pre-sentence reports that 
" [Defendant] was minimizing his involvement in... the robbery that occurred" and 
a police report that Defendant had not only pulled his gun, but threatened the store 
employee that he would "blow his head off." R132:4-6. 
The prosecutor then "recommend[ed] that [Defendant] be given 365 days jail 
with no credit for the time he's already served, that after that, he be placed on 36-
month probation with Adult Probation & Parole." R132:13. The prosecutor also 
asked for "gang conditions." Id. 
The victim was not present, but the prosecutor conveyed the victim's request 
for restitution and the victim's belief "that [Defendant] should be incarcerated as 
long as possible." R132:14. But the prosecutor added, "I did talk with him about the 
resolution and he was fine with the resolution." R132:15. 
Judicial Supervision Services then filed a pre-sentence report addendum 
dated March 6, 2009, noting that Defendant might not qualify for the substance 
abuse program in jail and recommending that he remain in jail for three to six 
months with no violations and then participate in 18 months of intensive outpatient 
substance abuse treatment. See JSS PSI Addendum at 1. 
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The court then addressed Defendant: "[I]t's a difficult decision for me, 
because of your age, really. If you weren't as young as you are, there would be no 
question in my mind that I would sentence you to prison/7 Id. The court then 
rehearsed its concerns with the use of the gun, the stealing, and the looting of the 
till. Id. The court then concluded, "[I]t's such a serious crime ... I'm comfortable 
with the recommendations that [AP&P] make[s] here, as difficult as it is. Fm going 
to follow them and impose the indeterminate term of five years to life in the State 
penitentiary." Id. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment, ordering that 
Defendant serve a prison sentence of five years to life. R113. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
On January 30, 2008, Defendant and two other men entered the Spring 
Communications store in Riverton and began looking around. R94:8,13. While 
Cassidy Mills, the store clerk, was occupied with the other two individuals, 
Defendant entered the storeroom and began loading up his arms with cell phones. 
R94:17-18. When Mills went to the storeroom and asked Defendant what he was 
doing, Defendant pulled out a gun and told Mills "to get the f back." R94:19. He 
also told Mills to get on the floor or he would blow his head off. See AP&P PSI at 3. 
4
 No trial was held. The Statement of Facts is taken from the preliminary 
hearing and from the factual summary of the offense in the presentence report 
prepared by AP&R 
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Defendant backed out of the room, pointing his gun at Mills, and shut the door. 
R94:19-20. Mills heard rustling in the store, the cash register being opened, and the 
chime that sounded when anyone entered or exited the front door. R94:20. Mills 
then exited the back room and called 911. R94:22. 
Defendant and the other two men had taken seven phones and the cash in the 
till, about $35. R94:22-23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
recommending that Defendant serve one year in jail with no credit for time served, 
rather than two years in jail with credit for time served. Defendant cannot prevail 
on this claim because he invited any error. In any case, he cannot demonstrate plain 
error because no error occurred. Alternatively, if error occurred it was neither 
obvious nor harmful. 
Point II: Defendant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the changed recommendation. The changed recommendation made it 
possible for Defendant to maintain the benefits of a favorable plea bargain. In any 
case, Defendant cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance because he cannot show 
prejudice: the change in the recommendation was harmless, where the trial court 
decided not to follow any recommendations regarding jail time, but to impose the 
statutory indeterminate prison term. 
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Point III: Defendant cannot prevail on his speculative plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor failed to convey her 
sentencing recommendations to AP&P, as promised. Nothing in the record 
demonstrates that the prosecutor did not convey those recommendations. 
Point IV: Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
recommending "gang conditions" in connection with her recommendation for 
probation. The prosecutor agreed not to seek gang enhancements; she made no 
promise not to seek "gang conditions" in connection with her recommendation that 
Defendant be given probation. 
Point V: Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
expressing her concerns about the level of support and supervision Defendant's 
family could give him and its bearing on the need for probation. The prosecutor 
made no promise not to recommend probation or probation conditions. 
Point VI: Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
advising the sentencing court that the victim felt that Defendant should be 
incarcerated for as long as possible. The prosecutor had not promised to remain 
silent as to the victim's concerns. More significantly, the prosecutor, as a 
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representative of a criminal justice agency, had a duty to assist the victim in 
conveying his concerns at sentencing. Also, as an officer of the court, she had a duty 
to bring relevant information to the court's attention. The victim's concerns about 
sentencing were relevant. The prosecutor conveyed those concerns fairly and 
expressly advised the court that, although the victim wanted Defendant 
incarcerated for as long as possible, he was //fine,/ with the plea agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in several 
ways. He claims that the prosecutor: 
(1) " agreed to recommend both in the presentence report and at sentencing 
that the judge suspend the prison term and impose a two-year jail term with credit 
for time served, followed by probation/' Br. Appellant at 12, but instead 
recommended at sentencing that he be sentenced to one year in jail with no credit 
for time served, id. at 13; 
(2) "did not make any recommendation for the presentence report as 
promised/' id. at 12; 
(3) "agreed to abandon gun and gang enhancements against [him]," Br. 
Appellant at 12, but instead "requested 'gang conditons' in sentencing," 
"intend[ing] to send the message that even though [the prosecutor] had agreed to 
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abandon gang enhancements, she considered it necessary to brand [Defendant] as 
affiliated with gangs/' id. at 14-15; 
(4) improperly "expressed 'concerns with the defendant's family/" id. at 
13-14; and 
(5) improperly advised the court that the victim felt that Defendant "should 
be incarcerated for as long as possible/' id. at 14. 
As Defendant concedes, his claims are unpreserved. See Br. Appellant at 2. 
He therefore argues plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 16. 
Defendant can prevail under neither doctrine. 
Supreme Court precedent addressing breach of plea agreements. The 
leading United States Supreme Court cases on breach of plea agreements are 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423 
(2009). Santobello addresses preserved claims, see 404 U.S. at 259; and Puckett 
addresses unpreserved claims, 129 S. Ct. at 1428-29. 
Santobello. In Santobello, the prosecution offered to permit the defendant 
to plead to a lesser-included offense and agreed to make no sentencing 
recommendation. 404 U.S. 258. Based on that offer, Santobello entered his plea. Id. 
A different prosecutor appeared at sentencing. Id. at 259. The new prosecutor 
recommended the maximum sentence. Id. Defense counsel immediately objected 
on the ground that the State had promised not to make a sentencing 
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recommendation. Id. Counsel asked to adjourn the sentencing hearing in order to 
prepare proof of the first prosecutor's promise. Id. 
The sentencing judge, however, continued with the hearing. Id. The judge 
stated that he was "not at all influenced by what the [new prosecutor had 
recommended]." Id. Rather, finding that Santobello had a "long, long serious 
criminal record" and that he was "unamenable to supervision in the community," 
the judge imposed the maximum sentence, a one-year prison term. Id. at 259-60. 
On certiorari, the State conceded that it had promised to abstain from making 
a recommendation. Id. at 262. The Supreme Court held that where a defendant 
objects to a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement, the defendant is entitled to 
relief. See id. Generally, that relief will be specific performance of the, plea 
agreement, usually before a different judge, or withdrawal of the plea, to be 
determined as the discretion of the state courts. Id. at 263. 
The Court determined that Santobello was entitled to a remedy even though 
the sentencing judge stated that the new prosecutor's recommendation did not 
influence him. Id. at 259, 262-63. Thus, the Court "declined to find harmless error 
because of the sentencing judge's statement that the prosecutor's recommendation 
did not influence him." 5 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.2(d) (3d ed. 2007). 
But, as explained, defense counsel objected at sentencing to the prosecutor's breach. 
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404 U.S. at 259. Thus, the error in Santobello was preserved. See Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 
1431; see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259. 
Puckett A different standard obtains where any claim that the prosecution 
breached the plea agreement is not preserved. Id. at 1432. Unpreserved error, 
including any claim that the prosecution breached the plea agreement, is reviewed 
under a plain error standard or under some other exception to the preservation rule. 
See id. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show not only that error 
occurred, but also that it was obvious and harmful. See id. at 1429.5 
The Supreme Court's holding in Puckett illustrates the application of the plain 
error rule to an alleged prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement. Puckett agreed to 
plead guilty to armed bank robbery and to a related felony. See 129 S. Ct. at 1426. In 
exchange, the State agreed that Puckett had accepted responsibility for his crimes 
and therefore qualified for a reduction in his offense level. See id. The government 
also agreed to request a sentence at the lowest end of the guideline level. See id. 
5
 Under the federal rules, plain-error review involves four steps or prongs. 
Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429. First, there must be an error that has not been 
affirmatively waived; second, the error must be clear or obvious; third, the error 
must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, ordinarily meaning that it 
affected the outcome of the proceedings; and fourth, "if the above three prongs are 
satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error —discretion 
which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Meeting all four prongs is difficult, as 
it should be." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Before sentencing, Puckett engaged in new criminal behavior and confessed 
his involvement to his probation officer. Id. at 1427. Reasoning that acceptance of 
responsibility required termination of criminal behavior, the government prepared 
an addendum to Puckett's presentence investigation report, recommending that he 
receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. 
Puckett objected to the addendum, but did not allege that the government 
was violating its obligations under the plea agreement. Id. The district court did 
not grant the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. 
The Supreme Court, holding that Puckett had not preserved his claim, 
reviewed Puckett's claim under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 1428. The Court held 
that Puckett had not established plain error because he had not shown prejudice, 
that is, he had not shown that the error "affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings/' Id. at 1429,1433. Given that Puckett did not terminate his criminal 
behavior, there was no likelihood that, absent the government's changed 
recommendation, the sentencing court would have granted him a sentencing 
reduction for the acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 1433. 
Utah law, "'Under ordinary circumstances, [Utah courts] will not consider an 
issue brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error 
or exceptional circumstances exist." State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, % 45,114 P.3d 551 
(quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 16,94 P.3d 186). To establish plain 
15 
error, a defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful/7 Alfatlawi, 2006 UT 
App 511,112. 
Proceedings below. Here, the prosecution and defense agreed to a State 
recommendation at the time Defendant entered his plea. They agreed that the State 
would recommend that Defendant's sentence be suspended, that he be placed on 
probation conditioned on his serving two years in jail, and that he be given credit 
for time served. R95-102;R131:1-10. Before sentencing, the two parties apparently 
renegotiated a minor portion of the agreement. Instead of recommending that 
probation be conditioned on Defendant's serving two years in jail with credit for 
time served, both parties affirmatively represented that the recommendation would 
be that the prison term be suspended, that Defendant be placed on probation 
conditioned on his serving one year in jail, and that he be given no credit for time 
served. R132:4,13. 
At sentencing, before the prosecutor made any recommendation, defense 
counsel told the court that "the State agreed to recommend a year in jail beyond the 
time the defendant had already served and at the conclusion of that year, they 
would recommend he be placed on probation." R132:4. He then asked the court to 
follow that recommendation. Id. When the prosecutor subsequently addressed the 
court, she made that very recommendation. She stated, "I would just note that the 
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State is recommending that the defendant be given 365 days jail with no credit for 
time he's already served, that after that, he be placed on 36-month probation with 
Adult Probation & Parole/7 R132:13. Defense counsel and the prosecutor thus both 
recommended that Defendant be given a jail term of one year beyond any time he 
had already served. 
The record does not expressly state why both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor agreed to this modification. The most reasonable inference is that the 
parties recognized that the court could not legally impose a term of two years in jail 
with credit for time served, the originally-agreed-upon recommendation. Under 
Utah law, a trial court may require a defendant to serve, as a condition of probation, 
"a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail/7 See Utah Code Arm. § 77-
18-l(8)(a)(v) (West Supp 2007). Thus, the trial court could not legally require a two-
year jail term with credit for time served. Moreover, by the time Defendant got to 
sentencing, he had already served just over one year—so an additional year on top 
of the first was, in practical effect, essentially the same recommendation and would 
have resulted in a similar period of confinement 
17 
I. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR'S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR, BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
INVITED ANY ERROR AT SENTENCING 
Defendant first claims that the trial court plainly erred for not noting and 
addressing the prosecutor's alleged breach of the plea agreement. He claims that 
the prosecutor "agreed to recommend both in the presentence report and at 
sentencing that the judge suspend the prison term and impose a two-year jail term 
with credit for time served, followed by probation/' id. at 12, but that she instead 
recommended at sentencing that he be sentenced to a year in jail with no credit for 
time served. Id. at 13. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because he invited 
any error below. 
A. Defendant may not obtain plain error review of this claim 
where Defendant where he invited the claimed error below. 
To establish plain error, a defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 12, 153 P.3d 804. But Utah 
appellate courts have consistently held that invited error precludes review, even for 
plain error. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 16,164 P.3d 366; State v. Winfield, 2006 
UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171; State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111; State v. 
Finder, 2005 UT 15, Tf 62,114 P.3d 551; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 
742. Under the invited error doctrine, appellate courts will not review a claim of 
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error when "'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the 
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]/" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, 
H 16 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4 , f14 ) (alteration in original). 
The invited error doctrine '"arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error.'" Id. at f 17 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f^ 15). It recognizes 
that parties are "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the 
benefit of objecting on appeal." Id. at 117 (citation and internal quotation omitted). 
It discourages parties "from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve 
a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). It is "designed to ... inhibit a defendant from foregoing ... an objection 
with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that 
strategy fails,... claiming on appeal that the court should reverse." Id. at ^ 17 n.18 
(citations and internal quotation omitted). 
Here, the State's recommendation at sentencing did result in a slightly 
different formulation of Defendant's jail sentence than that contemplated in the 
plea. Defendant notes that on the date of sentencing he had already served more 
than 13 months in jail. See Br. Appellant at 4. Thus, if the court had followed the 
prosecutor's recommendation, Defendant could have ended up serving an 
additional 30-plus days in jail beyond that contemplated at the time of the plea. 
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But Defendant, who did not preserve this claim below, invited any error. 
Defense counsel affirmatively represented to the Court that this was the agreed-
upon sentencing recommendation. R132:4. Given defense counsel's representation, 
the trial court can hardly be faulted for not sua sponte finding that the prosecutor 
breached any plea agreement. 
B. Defendant could not demonstrate plain error, in any event 
Defendant could not establish plain error, in any event. As stated, to establish 
plain error, a defendant must show an obvious, prejudicial error. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT 
App 511, Tf 12. Defendant cannot show error, much less obvious and harmful error. 
First, nothing in the record suggests any breach, where defense counsel and 
the prosecutor presented the same recommendation to the trial court.6 
6
 In addition, because any change in the plea agreement was not material, the 
change does not constitute error. A technical, but non-substantial change in a 
prosecutor's recommendation does not constitute a material breach. In reaching its 
decision, the Santobello court presumed that the prosecutor's breach was material. 
See 404 U.S. at 262.6 In fleshing out Santobello's reach in succeeding years, however, 
lower courts have directly held that only a material breach requires a remedy. "Not 
all breaches of a plea agreement require a remedy. A defendant is not entitled to 
relief when the breach is merely a technical one rather than a substantial and 
material breach of the agreement," that is, "one that violates the terms of the 
agreement and deprives the defendant of a material and substantial benefit for 
which he or she bargained." State v. Bowers, 696 N.W.2d 255,259 (Wis. App. 2005) 
(citations omitted). 
Here, the change in the recommended sentence, which could have resulted in 
Defendant's serving an extra month in jail, did not constitute a material breach. 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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Second, the claimed error could not have been obvious to the trial court where 
both defense counsel and the prosecutor concurred at sentencing on the terms of the 
agreed-upon recommendation. It would be odd indeed for a trial court to dispute 
the joint recommendation of both parties. Moreover, the original agreed-upon 
recommendation and the subsequent agreed-upon recommendation were 
functionally equivalent. Both would have resulted in an actual two-year jail term, 
with the possible difference of 30-plus days. 
Defendant was not deprived of the substantial benefit for which he bargained. In 
exchange for his plea, the State dropped group and gun enhancements that could 
have subjected him to five more years' incarceration. R131:3-4. Moreover, instead 
of recommending a five-years-to-life prison term, the State recommended a jail term 
of approximately a year— varying only slightly from the terms of the original plea. 
Thus, Defendant received the benefit of his bargain. 
Moreover," [although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains 
are essentially contracts/' Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1430 (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 
504, 508 (1984)). "When the consideration for a contract fails ... we say that the 
contract was broken" and "[t]he party injured by the breach will generally be 
entitled to some remedy." Id. (citing 23 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §§ 63.1,68.1 
(4th ed. 2003)). In determining whether the breach of a contractual promise 
(including a plea) is material, significant circumstances include the "extent to which 
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit he reasonably expected," "the 
extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture," and "the extent to 
which the behavior of the party failing to perform or offer to perform comports with 
standards of good faith and fair dealing." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 
(1981). 
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Third and most significantly, Defendant could not have shown harm. As 
explained in Puckett, to establish harm, a defendant must show that any error 
affected "affected the outcome of the proceedings." See 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant cannot show that a breach of 
the plea agreement is harmful where "he likely would not have obtained those 
benefits in any case." See id. at 1433. Here, the trial court chose not to follow the 
State's recommendation to suspend the prison term and impose probation 
conditioned on jail time. Instead, the court chose to impose the statutory 
indeterminate prison term of five years to life. R132:15. That decision was based on 
the court's assessment of the serious nature of the crime. Id. It had nothing to do 
with the prosecutor's more lenient recommendation of probation and any jail term 
that might have been imposed.7 
Thus, Defendant could not have shown harm. He could not have shown that 
the alleged breach affected the outcome of the proceedings, because he could not 
have shown that he would likely have obtained the benefits of the State's promise to 
recommend a slightly shorter jail time. The trial court determined not to suspend 
In Santobello, the new prosecutor's recommendation that Santobello serve the 
maximum allowable term was contrary to a core condition of the plea agreement— 
that the prosecutor would make no recommendation. 404 U.S. at 258-59. 
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Defendant's prison term. Under those circumstances, the State's recommendation 
as to the length of any jail term made no difference. 
Thus, even if Defendant had not invited error and if review for plain error 
had therefore been available, Defendant could not have established plain error. 
II. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT COUNSEL 
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS 
Defendant alternatively claims that counsel below was ineffective for not 
objecting to the prosecutor's recommendation that he serve a year in jail with no 
credit for time served. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant 
must show two things: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient—i.e, did not 
meet an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsels]' unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different/' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-
88, 694 (1984). Counsel's performance is not deficient where there is "some 
plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 
461,468 (Utah App. 1993). 
Here, there is a "plausible strategic explanation" not only for counsel's failure 
to object to the new recommendation, but also for his affirmative representation that 
the parties had apparently reached a slightly different agreement. As explained, 
counsel may well have realized that the trial court did not have the power to impose 
23 
a two-year sentence (even with credit for time served) as a condition of probation. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (8) (a) (v). 
To preserve the favorable plea agreement, he therefore agreed to this slightly 
different formulation of the State's recommended sentence to achieve essentially the 
same result initially achieved. Thus, a plausible strategy exists for defense counsel's 
agreeing to the modified recommendation. 
In any case, as explained, Defendant cannot show prejudice. Defendant 
suffered no prejudice because the State recommended a sentence that was 
functionally equivalent to the originally agreed-upon sentence. Moreover, the 
State's recommendation became immaterial when the trial court chose not to follow 
it, but to instead impose the statutory indeterminate prison term for Defendant's 
offense. SeeR132:15. 
III. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS PLAIN 
ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIMS THAT THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT CONVEY HER 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS TO AP&P 
Defendant also claims that that the prosecutor "did not make any 
recommendation for the presentence report as promised." Br. Appellant at 12. This 
claim is wholly speculative and lacks record support. 
Relevant law, "Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their 
appeals, including the burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the 
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record/7 See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tf 17, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted). 
These burdens apply to plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See 
id. at f f 8,17. 
Recognizing that trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness may sometimes have 
caused or exacerbated record deficiencies, Utah adopted rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Id. at % 14,16. This rule provides that a party to an appeal 
"may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of 
fact[] necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Id. at f 14 (citing Utah R. App. P. 23B). 
Rule 23B provides a means for an appellant to meet his burden, but it does not 
change the burden. If the record is inadequate, the appellant must take the 
necessary steps to seek and obtain a rule 23B remand. Whether he seeks and obtains 
the remand or not, "an appellate court will presume that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which 
defendant is aware." Id. at \ 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in 
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
Analysis. Here, Defendant claims that the prosecutor did not convey her 
recommendation of a suspended sentence, probation, and jail time to the pre-
sentence investigator. See Br. Appellant at 12. In support of his claim, Defendant 
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points to the PSI prepared by AP&P. See id. He relies on the absence in the PSI of 
any recommendation by the prosecutor as proof that the prosecutor did not make 
the promised recommendation. The absence of the prosecutor's recommendation in 
the PSI, however, does not prove that no recommendation was made. It is entirely 
possible, and indeed likely, that the prosecutor made the recommendation, but that 
the AP&P preparer chose to ignore that recommendation, which he was entitled to 
do. 
Nothing in the record supports Defendant's claim that the prosecutor failed to 
make the promised recommendation, that the trial court should have been aware of 
her failure to make such a recommendation, or that defense counsel performed 
ineffectively for not calling such a failure to the attention of the trial court. 
If Defendant believed that the prosecutor had not made the promised 
recommendation, he could have moved for a hearing under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, to put on evidence to support his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's failure to make a recommendation to 
AP&P. There, Defendant could have put on evidence, had any existed, that the 
prosecutor did not convey the recommendation to AP&P, and that counsel should 
have discovered that matter and objected. Defendant did not. 
Thus, Defendant has not presented a record to support his claim that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not making the promised 
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recommendation. Where the facts underlying his claims remain wholly speculative, 
Defendant has not met his burden to prove either plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
IV. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS PLAIN ERROR AND 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY 
REQUESTING GANG CONDITIONS 
Defendant claims that although the prosecutor " agreed to abandon gun and 
gang enhancements against [him]/7 Br. Appellant at 12, she "requested 'gang 
conditons' in sentencing,... intend [ing] to send the message that even though [she] 
had agreed to abandon gang enhancements, she considered it necessary to brand 
[Defendant] as affiliated with gangs/' Id. at 14-15. Defendant claims that the 
prosecutor thereby breached the plea agreement, and that the court should have sua 
sponte recognized this breach and that his counsel should have objected to it. Br. 
Appellant at 13-14,16-23. 
The prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement by requesting "gang 
conditions/' "Gang enhancements" and "gang conditions" are two different things. 
"Gang enhancements," also called "group enhancements," are aggravators that may 
be charged where a defendant commits an offense in concert with two or more 
persons, and charging gang enhancements may result in increased penalties. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1. "Gang conditions," on the other hand, are merely 
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conditions sometimes imposed as part of probation, intended to prohibit 
associations that could lead to probation violations. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(8)(a)(x) (West Supp. 2007) ("[A]s a condition of probation, the court may require 
that the defendant... comply with ... conditions the court considers appropriate"). 
Here, the prosecutor agreed "not to pursue the gun and gang enhancements/' 
R99 (emphasis added). She fulfilled that promise when she dropped the 
enhancements charged in the information. See R2; see also R105. Nothing in the 
sentencing transcript suggests that those matters were before the court. See R132. 
Significantly, no one asked the court to impose additional time based on the 
enhancements, nor did the court do so. 
But the prosecutor made no promise to limit any recommendations she might 
have with respect to probation conditions. Defendant points to no record evidence 
that she did. Absent evidence that the parties expected the State to remain silent as 
to probation conditions, Defendant has not shown a breach. 
Because Defendant cannot show any breach, he cannot show that the trial 
court plainly erred for not addressing it or that defense counsel performed 
ineffectively for not objecting to it. 
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V. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS PLAIN ERROR AND 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY 
EXPRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT DEFENDANTS FAMILY 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly "expressed 'concerns with 
the defendant's family.'" Br. Appellant at 13-14. Defendant suggests that these 
statements violated the plea agreement because they sent a veiled message to the 
sentencing court that greater punishment was warranted than that provided for in 
the plea agreement. See Br. Appellant at 13-14. 
While the prosecutor agreed to recommend a suspended prison term, she 
explained in the plea agreement that she would recommend a jail term and 
probation. See R99. She made no agreement to remain silent as to the nature or 
conditions of probation. See id. 
At sentencing, as promised, the prosecutor recommended a suspended prison 
term and probation conditioned on Defendant's serving a jail term to be followed by 
36-months' supervision by AP&P. R132:13-14. In explaining the need for probation 
and continued supervision, the prosecutor noted that Defendant's family support 
was not all that defense counsel may have suggested, see R132:10, and observed that 
one family member had lied to Defendant's attorney and another had procured a 
false statement in connection with Defendant's prosecution, R132:14. In sum, she 
stated, "And so I think his family support doesn't necessarily give me any 
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reassurances that he's going to behave.... While he may have been a good boy at 
one point, he did take a turn for the worst and this behavior, itself, I think warrants, 
at minimum, another year in jail followed by 36-months['] probation/' R132:13-14. 
The prosecutor's statements about the need for probation and continuing 
supervision did not violated the plea agreement. The prosecutor had made no 
promise to remain silent as to these matters. Defendant points to no record 
evidence that she did. Absent evidence that the parties expected the State to remain 
silent as to such matters, Defendant has not proven prosecutorial breach. 
Because Defendant cannot show any breach, he cannot show that the trial 
court plainly erred for not addressing it or that defense counsel performed 
ineffectively for not objecting to it. 
VI. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS PLAIN ERROR AND 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT WHEN 
SHE PRESENTED THE VICTIM'S STATEMENTS 
Defendant finally claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
conveying to the trial court the victim's belief that Defendant should be incarcerated 
for as long as possible. Br. Appellant at 14. Defendant claims that "the prosecutor's 
statements were an end-run around the promise to recommend a limited jail term 
with credit for time served." Id. 
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At sentencing, the trial court asked whether the complaining witness was 
there to speak. R132:14. The prosecutor stated that Cassidy Mills, the store clerk, 
was not there, but that he had told her that he wanted to request restitution. Id. 
Mills told her that the stolen phones could not be sold after they had been returned 
and that the Spring store had suffered a $2,136 loss. Id. 
The prosecutor also stated, "And with regards to Mr. Mills, he felt that the 
defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible/' Id. She continued, "I did 
talk with him about the resolution and he was fine with the resolution/7 R132:15. 
Relevant law, A prosecutor, as a representative of a criminal justice agency, 
has a duty to "'assist' victims in exercising their right to be heard" at "important 
criminal ... justice hearings." State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ^f| 24, 29, 44 P.3d 756 
(addressing the Victims' Rights Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3, and the Rights of 
Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(1)). Moreover, as an officer of the 
court, a prosecutor has a duty "to bring relevant information to the court's 
attention." Casey, 2002 UT 29, If 37 (addressing the Victims' Rights Amendment, 
Utah Const, art. I § 28, and Rights of Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38-1 
to 77-38-14). 
Analysis, Here, under the Victims' Rights Amendment and relevant 
statutory law, the victim had a right to be heard at sentencing. The prosecutor had a 
duty to assist him in exercising that right. See Casey, 2002 UT 29, | f 24, 29. The 
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prosecutor's conveying the victim's request for restitution and the victim's views on 
sentencing was an appropriate means to assist the victim. In conveying them, the 
prosecutor complied with the law. 
Moreover, as an officer of the court, the prosecutor had a duty to bring 
relevant information to the court's attention. See id. at f 37. The victim's concerns 
were relevant information. Here, the prosecutor conveyed those concerns fairly, 
stating that although the victim wanted Defendant incarcerated as long as possible, 
the victim was "fine" with the plea agreement, which recommended approximately 
a year in jail following sentencing. Again, in so doing, the prosecutor complied with 
the law. 
Moreover, nothing in the plea agreement suggests that prosecutor promised 
not to convey the victim's position. In view of the requirements that the prosecutor 
assist the victim to be heard and that she convey relevant information to the court, 
and absent evidence that the parties expected the State to remain silent as to these 
matters, Defendant has not established prosecutorial breach. 
In sum, because Defendant has shown no breach, he cannot show that the trial 
court plainly erred for not addressing it or that defense counsel performed 
ineffectively for not objecting to it. Defendant also cannot establish plain error or 
ineffective assistance because he has not shown prejudice. The trial court explained 
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that it ordered a prison term, not because of anything the victim may have said, but 
because of the serious nature of the crime. See R132:15-16.8 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Defendant has not demonstrated plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and this Court should affirm his conviction. 
Respectfully submitted December^ , 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
jEApffiB. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
8
 For the same reason, Defendant cannot show that any of the alleged 
breaches of the plea agreement resulted in harm. The nature of the crime, not any 
comment by the prosecutor, drove the trial court's decision to impose the statutory 
prison term. See R132:15-16. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UT/JBL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. flft79/W> ? 2 . y f ^ C 
Defendant. 
JZ 5 hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
TJ 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading /guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 









I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
LiL 
i n 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty_(or no contest) are: 
JLlL 9 r ^ p^l <\ / Y 7 ^ r 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest): 
M: n-
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I {have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / n CCU*A& CWrl$\jixw\t 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and ther consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses- I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, 1 will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Y & ' > C->v J *>\ r«- ^  *—e. 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) ((jis^ are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
^ ^ ) ~T^r ^A^S^,4r)<- Afrfe ^ r ^ , < j ~h> j& :'-» ir\ Q. H° 2» 
fl ? H ^vy 4^ *** cAu
 t ^ -^^ U>^ v:r Lrt ^ -f^> ^ <s~ £± ^ * 2^ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 2=Oyears of age. I have attended school through the / '2- grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this ( 5 day of December , 2 0 ftfr 
f M/ 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Ah Mo-r/p S I K ^ C the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the' meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
BarNo. tfKlf 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
/\hr^h->**-> Sn-J*3~£S^
 9 defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTED ATTORNEY 
Bar No. 9 S V ' ¥ 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this I *T day of Oee en^!>>/"" . 2 0 t < 
DISTRICT COURT 
Form revised 6/25/03 1 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Your Honor, would the Court be 
willing to call Abraham Mario Shaffer? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: He's in custody. 
MS. JOHNSON: Sandi Johnson for the State. 
MS. CHRISTIANSEN: McCaye Christianson appearing 
with Mr. Shaffer. 
Judge, this matter, I believe, is set for 
disposition today and we do have a negotiated resolution to 
put on the record today. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, what is contemplated 
is that Mr. Shaffer will enter a guilty plea to aggravated 
robbery, a first-degree felony, as charged in the Information. 
In exchange for that, there are three things that 
have been offered, inducements that have been offered by the 
State. The first is that in connection with the--the charge 
in the Information, the State was pursuing both a gun 
enhancement and a gang enhancement, which would have added a 
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total of five years to the potential sentencing in this case, 
and those will be abandoned by the State in exchange for the 
plea. 
Additionally, your Honor, the State will be 
recommending at the--both to the--the pre-sentence 
investigator and at the time of sentencing to your Honor, that 
the prison sentence in this case be suspended and that the 
Court instead order Mr. Shaffer to serve two years in the 
County Jail, with credit for time served. 
Finally, in the event that Mr. Shaffer is successful 
in completing this five-year probationary period, upon being 
released from the County Jail, assuming that the Court does 
choose to approve that--that sentencing recommendation, at the 
conclusion of the five years, probation having been 
successfully completed, the State will be joining in my motion 
for the degree of the offense to be lowered by one level, from 
a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: And your Honor, I have reviewed, 
I have filled out and reviewed a--a plea form with my client. 
I read the entire form out loud to him and he read (inaudible) 
along with me. 
THE COURT: I see. That's the State's offer in this 
case, Counsel? 
MS. JOHNSON: It is, your Honor, and we would move 
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to amend Count 1 by just striking the language, it's halfway 
down through the paragraph, the sentence ends: and/or caused 
serious bodily injury to Cassie Mills, period. Then it's the 
next sentence, begins, "Further." Starting with "further", 
the remaining of that paragraph, the State would strike that, 
with the understanding he's going to be pleading guilty to 
Count 1 then as charged. 
THE COURT: Now, is Mr. Shaffer the one who had the 
firearm in this robbery? 
MS. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shaffer, the State's made an offer 
of--to have you plead guilty to aggravated robbery, as 
charged, except the enhancement would be stricken, the 
enhancements. 
Is that what you understand? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
(Inaudible discussion between Counsel and Mr. 
Shaffer) 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shaffer, let me just explain. The 
sentence that you face is--is a sentence of five years to life 
in prison. And there's no guarantee that I won't impose that, 
even though the State is not recommending that, in fact, is 
recommending a jail sentence instead. And if I chose to put 
you on probation, they'd recommend that you--that your--with 
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guilty plea to the first-degree felony be withdrawn and you 
enter it, instead, to a second-degree felony. Those things 
are not binding on me. If they were and if it were proposed 
that way, I wouldn't accept it. So, I want to make it clear 
that I could give you the five-year-to-life sentence and 
there's no promise, no guarantee of any kind that you won't 
get that. Do you understand that? 
MR. SHAFFER: I understand. 
THE COURT: If you plead guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're 
giving up the right that you have to a speedy trial before a 
public and impartial jury. You're presumed to be innocent of 
this charge and all of its elements and you have the right to 
a jury trial. The State would have to convince the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of all the 
elements of the offense and they'd have to convince the jury 
unanimously that you were guilty of all the elements of this 
offense or you would not be found guilty. 
At the trial, you have the right to remain silent, 
no one could force you to testify against yourself; in other 
words, you have the right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination. But at the trial, if you wanted to, you could 
testify and let the jury hear your side of what happened. 
In fact, you'd have the right to have other 
witnesses testify for you and to have those witnesses 
subpoenaed and their attendance at trial compelled. You'd 
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have the right to cross-examine or ask questions of the 
State's attorney (sic), you have the right to an appeal. 
If you plead guilty today, you're giving up all of 
those rights. Do you understand all of that? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The only right that you're not giving up 
of that group is the right to an appeal, but that right is 
certainly limited if you plead guilty. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: By pleading guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're 
admitting that you committed the crime. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to admit that you 
committed this crime? 
Did you have a question, Mr. Shaffer? 
MR. SHAFFER: I just asked what the difference was 
between guilty and no contest plea. 
THE COURT: I don't think the State would accept a 
no contest plea and I don't believe that I would, either, in 
this case. So, if you don't want to plead guilty, of course, 
you don't have to and we could set this matter for trial. 
MR. SHAFFER: I plead guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. If you plead guilty, you're 
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1 admitting that you committed the crime and I'm going to define 
2 it for you. It alleges that you, as a party to the offense, 
3 unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take, 
4 personal property in the possession of someone else from that 
5 person or from their immediate presence and against their will 
6 and that you did so by means of force or fear and that you 
7 used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, those--or--
8 and/or you caused serious bodily injury, which I don't believe 
9 is alleged here. But those are the elements of the offense. 
10 Do you understand that, Mr. Shaffer? 
11 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Are you willing to admit that you 
13 committed that crime a I explained it to you? 
14 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: I'm going to ask the State, if you 
16 would, please, to explain the factual basis for this charge. 
17 MS. JOHNSON: Sorry, your Honor? 
18 THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, could I have you explain 
19 the factual basis for the charge? 
2 0 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, on January 3 0th of 2 008, 
21 the defendant, along with two other individuals, entered a 
22 Sprint telephone store. They then took phones, the defendant 
23 specifically walked into a bathroom, pointed a gun at the cell 
24 phone's employer--or employee of the store and demanded some 
25 more phones. He then ran out of that store's closet with, I 
believe, it was eight 
individuals that were 
took money out of the 
the store. 
THE COURT: 
cell phones. And then the other 
outside in the main part of the room, 
till. Those individuals then fled from 
I see. 
Does Mr. Shaffer disagree with any part of the 



































No, your Honor. 
Okay. 
I'll find that it does in fact make out 
the form in front of you, your attorney 
followed along,* did you read it and 
Yes, your Honor. 
Did you--are you willing to give up 
Yes, your Honor. 
Are you doing all of this voluntarily? 
Yes, your Honor. 
I'll ask you to sign it then, please. 
Are you right-handed? 
Yeah, right. 


















, do you have any 




All right. To the charge 
a first-degree felony, how is-










accept the guilty pl< 
I'll refer Mr. Shaffer to the 














set sentencing, unless there's an 














: That works for me, 
Mr. Shaffer, we'll 
Thank you, 
hearing was < 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Your Honor, would the Court be 
willing to call Abraham Shaffer. 
THE COURT: I sure will. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MS. JOHNSON: Sandi Johnson for the State. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I received the papers from the 
Judicial Supervision Services this morning that you'd sent 
over. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Great. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: McCaye Christianson appearing 
with Abraham Shaffer. This matter is set for sentencing, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). And I have read 
the report, again, and I'm familiar with the information there 
as well as letters that have been submitted and the--the 
review of the information from Judicial Supervision Services. 
So, Counsel, go ahead. 
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MS. CHRISTIANSON: All right, your Honor. Thank 
you. 
Your Honor, what--as the Court is aware, at the time 
of our sentencing in this matter, there was a negotiated 
settlement of the charges and as a part of those negotiations, 
the State agreed to recommend a year in jail beyond the time 
that the defendant had already served and at the conclusion of 
that year, they would recommend he be placed on probation. 
And I'm asking the Court this morning to follow the 
State's recommendation, which I believe the State will be 
renewing later and which time--the State had agreed to at the 
time that the pleas were taken--that the plea was taken. 
There are two specific matters I'd like to address, 
your Honor, if the Court will indulge me--
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: --in regards to the pre-sentence 
report that was prepared by A P & P and also some of these 
matters are echoed in the second report that was prepared by 
Judicial Supervision Services. First of all, your Honor, the-
-the pre-sentence reports, both pre-sentence reports indicated 
that they felt that Abraham was minimizing his involvement in 
this--the robbery that occurred. 
And so I'd like to just review the--the facts a 
little bit with your Honor in regards to what happened in this 
underlying count. 
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The allegation is that Abraham and two other young 
men went to the cell phone business, Sprint Communications, 
that they went in. When they arrived, Abraham did not 
brandish a firearm, he went back to a storage room in back of 
the store and loaded up his arms with cell phones and as he 
was leaving the storage room, he was confronted by Cassie 
Mills, a very intrepid and courageous clerk who worked in the 
store, who actually, physically confronted Abraham, dislodging 
some of the cell phones from Abraham's arms. 
When Abraham bent down to pick up those cell phones, 
he, Abraham says, that a gun which he had in his waist band 
fell out of his waist band and he then picked it up and held 
it on Mr. Mills and ordered Mr. Mills onto the floor and 
ordered him to stay, this would be at gun point that he 
ordered Mr. Mills to stay on the floor. And so he and the 
(inaudible) the crime scene. 
Mr. Mills has indicated that--or--or testified at 
the prelim and otherwise indicated that Abraham pulled the 
gun--the phones fell, Abraham pulled the gun out of his waist 
band, dropped the gun, picked up the gun and the phones and 
then held the gun on Mr. Mills. 
So, there is a slight discrepancy in whether the gun 
fell first or was pulled out first, but everybody agrees that 
Abraham did hold the gun on Mr. Mills, that he pointed it at 
Mr. Mills at close range and that he ordered Mr. Mills to get 
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on the floor. 
So, I think everyone agrees, including Abraham, that 
the behavior was extremely menacing and did involve forcing 
Mr. Mills onto the ground with the use of a firearm. 
Additionally, your Honor, both pre-sentence 
investigators got kind of hung up on whether or not Abraham 
had said--had threatened to blow Mr. Mills' head off. Abraham 
said that he didn't make that threat and in reviewing the--the 
police reports and other documentation in regards to this 
case, I just wanted to indicate to the Court, there was an 
initial police report on the day of the robbery in which the 
police report attributed to Mr. Mills' statement that--that 
Abraham had said, Get on the floor and if you don't stay 
there, I'll blow your head off. 
But then Mr. Mills was interviewed later in the day, 
the same day of the robbery, by a police officer who quoted 
Mr. Mills, in quotation marks, as saying that Abraham told 
him, Get on the floor and stay there until we leave the store 
and there was no mention of a threat to blow his head off. 
Mr. Mills, that same day, wrote a statement, which I 
have provided to the Court, a handwritten statement, in which 
he says that Abraham had ordered him to get on the floor and 
stay there and there's no mention of blowing his head off. 
And then again, Mr. Mills actually testified at a 
preliminary hearing in this matter and was posed a question on 
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any statements or threats that may have been made to him at 
the time of the robbery and at the prelim, when specifically 
asked whether he was threatened, he said that he was not; 
although, of course, he said, you know, he was holding a gun 
to my head. I mean, there--there was obviously a--not only an 
implicit but an overt threat of violence, but at the prelim, 
he did not testify in regards to any verbal threat to blow his 
head off being made. 
And your Honor, I--personally, I don't really think 
it's that important, but I just wanted to clarify that with 
the Court that that really is in dispute and it appears that--
that even--it's not necessarily clear that even Mr. Mills 
would assert that those exact words were said. 
I don't know that it matters what exact words were 
said, he had a gun held to his head and obviously, there was a 
threat, an overt threat. I don't know that it matters, but I-
-I'm only going over that with the Court here because I feel 
that the pre-sentence investigators sort of clung to that 
discrepancy to make their case that Abraham wasn't accepting 
responsibility. And I think that he has accepted 
responsibility for robbing someone at gun point, regardless of 
what exactly--what words were--were said at the time. 
Also, your Honor, in the--the pre-sentence report 
that was done by A P & P, the investigator suggests that 
Abraham isn't taking responsibility because he doesn't admit 
7 
being a member in a gang. And the--the A P & P investigator 
seems to feel that because there was originally a gang 
enhancement charged in this case and because Abraham referred 
to the co-perpetrators by nicknames that that proves that 
Abraham--Abraham is a gang member. And obviously, the gang 
enhancement is more of a group enhancement, not necessarily 
indicating gang membership and I think the fact that Abraham 
may have known nicknames which--which the co-perpetrators used 
doesn't mean that he was a member of their gang or--or I don't 
know if they were in the same gang, if they are gang members, 
but I don't think that there's proof of gang membership here. 
And the fact that Abraham denies gang membership, I think, 
should not be seen as denial of responsibility or refusal to 
admit what he did here. 
All right. Next, your Honor, the--the pre-sentence 
investigators remarked on the write-ups that Abraham had 
during the, I think it's been about, I don't know, 14 months 
now that he's been in the County Jail, and it's true that 
Abraham has had numerous write-ups, but he--he has brought 
those with him this morning and I don't know if the Court 
would like to look those over. I have those if the Court 
would like to see those; but your Honor, they're write-ups for 
passing a note, passing an envelope, passing a candy bar. His 
toilet got clogged and he was sweeping the water out of his 
cell into the corridor. I--I don't see any indication that--
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that the toilet was deliberately clogged, but it's a matter 
of--of how he was dealing with the water by sweeping it into 
the corridor that was a problem. 
He had a pen, on one occasion. He believed that a 
guard had removed some food from his tray to antagonize him 
and--and he threw the tray, not at the guard, but out--out of 
the--I'm sorry, it was not a guard, but an inmate, who 
apparently had removed some food, (inaudible) and Abraham 
threw the tray, not at the other inmate, however. 
So, I just want to say that I think looking over the 
write-ups, I think that they show some immaturity on Abraham's 
part, some difficulty adjusting to the extremely stressful and 
highly constrained circumstances of the jail, but there isn't 
anything like an attack on a guard, an attack on another 
prisoner, there's no allegation of a criminal misconduct in 
the jail. 
And I have talked to Abraham about the--the 
seriousness, even, of--of minor matters and the importance of 
complying with all the rules while he is in the County Jail. 
And I believe that he is resolved to--to not give into 
childish impulses to act out, not to do things like--like 
giving someone an envelope or giving someone a candy bar that 
might seem insignificant, but that nevertheless is a breach in 
a security institution and is a violation of the rules. 
And I believe that if the Court would--would follow 
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the State's recommendation in this matter and give Abraham the 
opportunity to serve an additional year in the jail, that 
these types of infractions will not continue to occur. 
And next, your Honor, I--I just wanted to point out 
to the Court that I did provide the Court with a couple of 
photographs that Abraham's mother wanted the Court to have 
and--and I know that the Court, there are many, many, many 
matters pending before the Court and I don't know if the Court 
has any independent recollection of Abraham's appearances, but 
his family has been present at his appearances, his mother and 
sisters are here today, as well as his spiritual advisor, Rod 
Gilmore. 
Abraham has a very, very supportive and loving 
family and his mother wanted the Court to have those 
photographs just to let the Court know that--that Abraham is 
a--a young person who, until late in his teenage years, was 
(inaudible) youth; in recent years, he has been arrested a 
number of times, according to their--I think there are a few 
or a couple of misdemeanor convictions on his record, but no 
felony convictions. And his--his family just wanted the Court 
to know that he is--that he has been a--a good and high-
functioning, loyal, treasured member of their family and they-
- their belief is that he has the determination to become that 
again. 
The Court has letters from past employers who are--
10 
have really valued Abraham's services as an employee and 
would--would welcome the opportunity of again engaging his 
services when he's released from the County Jail. 
Your Honor, also, I just want to draw the Court's 
attention to the--the issue of inter-case proportionality. 
The co-perpetrators in this matter, my understanding is that 
they served a year in jail and were then placed on probation 
after pleading guilty to second-degree felonies. And I feel, 
since Abraham was the only person who is known to have been 
carrying a gun on that day, it makes sense that he enter a 
plea to a first as opposed to a second and that he would serve 
two or two-plus years in jail rather than one year in jail; 
but I think looking at the way that the co-perpetrators were 
handled, the resolution that was endorsed by Ms. Johnson on 
behalf of the District Attorney's Office makes sense. 
And finally, your Honor, I just wanted to let the 
Court know that during the pendency of these proceedings 
before your Honor, I've had opportunity to visit on numerous 
occasions with Abraham and he has expressed his remorse to me, 
he's expressed profound shame and regret about his behavior. 
He's expressed, on his own, without being prompted, he's 
expressed sympathy for the--the victim and speculated that it 
would be a very terrifying experience to be robbed at 
gunpoint. He's expressed regret that he ever was engaged in 
behavior that would have caused so much fear to another 
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person. 
And your Honor, I--my impression, based on my 
dealing with him is that his expressions of remorse are 
sincere and that he genuinely desires to address problems in 
his life that have led to this low point and to--to change his 
life and become--to get back on the track that he was on as a 
younger man and not have any future involvement with the 
criminal justice system. 
I believe if the Court follows the State's 
recommendations, that Abraham will not disappoint you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaffer, anything else you'd 
like to say? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SHAFFER: Well, I would like to apologize for--
as to the behavior I did. I really am deeply sorry for just 
being so stupid and allowing myself to do something so--this 
is a terrible thing that I did, a aggravated robbery and 
robbing someone at gunpoint. I--I didn't realize at the time 
how long it would be, but--and how terrifying it would be to 
be a store clerk at that time. If he were here, I would like 
to apologize to him. 
And I want to apologize to my family for acting the 
way I did and letting them down with my (inaudible) a criminal 
act and I want--I want to try my hardest if I get another 
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chance to get back on the right track and get on with my life 
and just be--be a credit to the society (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, Ms. Johnson, did you have 
comments or recommendations? 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I would just note that the 
State is recommending that the defendant be given 3 65 days 
jail with no credit for the time he's already served, that 
after that, he be placed on 36-month probation with Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
I am asking for gang conditions, while the defendant 
may claim he's not a member of a gang, given that the co-
defendants he was with were members of gangs, they're 
documented members of gangs and the defense has verified that 
he needs to have gang conditions. 
I was unaware of the defendant's write-ups at the 
jail until I received the pre-sentence report, which was prior 
to my recommendation. I've reviewed those, I'm still going to 
stick with my recommendation. It is a zero tolerance. 
In this case, although the defendant's is now being 
very supported, I have concerns with the defendant's family; 
frankly, his father, your--your Honor actually heard the 
material witness hearing where the father went and manipulated 
a--a gentleman into writing a false statement about Mr. 
Shaffer's whereabouts. And so I think his family support 
doesn't necessarily give me any reassurances that he's going 
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to behave. 
And his sister went in and lied to his attorney and 
then forwarded that--that on to myself in order to get him 
off. His father went and procured a false statement; so, 
frankly, anything from his family, I don't take to be true. 
While he may have been a good boy at one point, he 
did take a turn for the worst and this behavior, itself, I 
think warrants, at minimum, another year in jail followed by 
36-months probation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
And the complaining witness is not here, Counsel, to 
speak? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor, Mr. Mills is not here. 
He did express to me on numerous occasions, including at the 
preliminary hearing, that--well, first of all, with regard to 
restitution, that restitution amount does need to be ordered. 
The phones were returned to Sprint, but they were not able to 
be sold at all and the restitution amount of $2,136, I did 
verify with Mr. Mills and Sprint--or Sprint Communications, 
actually, I guess, that that is the amount of restitution for 
those phones. They had all been removed from the boxes and 
been compromised, their--the chips and so they were unable to 
be sold. 
And with regards to Mr. Mills, he felt that the 
defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible. 
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I did talk with him about the resolution and he was 
fine with the resolution. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaffer, it's a difficult 
decision for me, because of your age, really. If you weren't 
as young as you are, there would be no question in my mind 
that I would sentence you to prison. 
In looking at what you've been charged with doing, 
the crime certainly warrants the sentence of imprisonment. 
Whether or not the gun fell first or whether you pulled it 
from your waist band really isn't critical and I suppose 
whether you uttered the words "Get down on the ground or I'm 
going to shoot you or blow your head off," the threat was 
certainly there. It's hard to interpret in any other way when 
you pulled a gun on him. 
And then the fact that not only did--did your 
friends and yourself steal the phones that I guess they'd gone 
on--into the store to steal in the first place, but looted the 
till and took additional merchandise from the front of the 
store, it's such a serious crime, Mr. Shaffer, I'm comfortable 
with the recommendations that they make here, as difficult as 
it is. I'm going to follow them and impose the indeterminate 
term of five years to life in the State penitentiary. 
I'll also order that you pay the restitution in the 
sum of $2,13 6, that would be jointly and severally with the 
co-defendants; but--but given what you've done here, it just 
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seems to me that a sentence of imprisonment is the only 
reasonable sentence. So, I'll follow the recommendation. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
• * * 
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